色花堂

Bibliography

Below is sample research that either applies the EITM framework or provides background in formal analysis, empirical tests, and methodology in general.

Achen, C. H. 1983. 鈥淭oward Theories of Data: The State of Political Methodology.鈥 In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. A. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. 

Achen, Christopher H., 2002. "Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and ART.鈥 Annual Review of Political Science 5: 423-450. 

Achen, C. H. 2005. 鈥淟et's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong.鈥 Conflict Management and Peace Science 22:327鈥339. 

Achen, C. H. 2006. 鈥淓xpressive Bayesian Voters, their Turnout Decisions, and Double Probit: Empirical Implications of a Theoretical Model.鈥 Typescript. Princeton University.

Aldrich, J., Alt, J. 2003. 鈥淚ntroduction to the Special Issue on Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models.鈥 Political Analysis, 11(4): 309-315.  

Aldrich, J. H., J. E. Alt, and A. Lupia. 2008. 鈥淭he EITM Approach: Origins and Interpretations.鈥 In The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, eds. J. M. Box Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, and D. Collier. New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 828-843. 

Alesina, A., Rosenthal, H., 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, New York. 

Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A. 2002. The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies.鈥 Southern Economic Journal 69(1): 21-47.  

Arrow, K. J. 1948. 鈥淢athematical Models in the Social Sciences.鈥 In Advances in Experimental Psychology, eds. D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 

Banks, J. S., Kiewiet, D. R. 1989. 鈥淓xplaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections.鈥 American Journal of Political Science 33(4): 997-1015. 

Black, G. S. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." American Political Science Review 66(1): 144鈥59.  

Blais, A., Achen, C. H. 2011. 鈥淭aking Civic Duty Seriously: Political Theory and Voter Turnout.鈥 Working Paper.  Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., H. E. Brady, and D. Collier., eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J. 1985. 鈥淐ulture and the Evolutionary Process.鈥 The University of Chicago Press.  
Cagan, P. 1956. "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation". In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Friedman, Milton (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Chamley, C.P., 2004. Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning. Cambridge University Press, New York. 

Clarke, H., Granato, J. 2004. 鈥淎utocorrelation: From Practice to Theory.鈥 In K. Kampf-Leonard (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Measurement. San Diego: Academic Press. 

Eckel, Catherine C., and Rick Wilson, 2004. Is Trust a Risky Decision? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55: 447-465. 

Evans, G.W., Honkapohja, S., 2001. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 

Farmer, J. D., and D. Foley. 2009. 鈥淭he Economy Needs Agent-based Modelling.鈥 Nature 460: 685-686. 
Fey, M., McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1996. 鈥淎n Experimental Study of the Constant-Sum Centipede Game.鈥 International Journal of Game Theory 25(3): 269-87. 

Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz. 1991. 鈥淎ppendix: A Cautionary Tale about Multiple Regressions.鈥 American Economic Review 81: 48-49. 

Gabaix, X., and D. Laibson. 2008. 鈥淭he Seven Properties of Good Models.鈥 In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, eds. A. Caplin and A. Schotter. New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 292-299. 

Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., Larimer, C. W. 2008. Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment. American Political Science Review 102(1): 33-48.  

Granato, J., M.C.S.Wong. 2004. 鈥淧olitical Campaign Advertising Dynamics.鈥 Political Research Quarterly, 57(3): 349-361. 

Granato, J., M. Lo., M.C.S.Wong. 2010b. 鈥淎 Framework for Unifying Formal and Empirical Analysis.鈥 American Journal of Political Science 54, 3: 783-797. 

Granato, J., M. Lo, M.C.S. Wong. 2011. 鈥淢odeling and Testing the Diffusion of Expectations: An EITM Approach.鈥 Electoral Studies. 30: 389-398.

Granato, J., F. Scioli. 2004. 鈥淧uzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Consequences of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM).鈥 Perspectives on Politics 2: 313-323.

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D., Weinstein, J. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach." American Political Science Review 101(04): 709-725.

Haney, Patrick J., Roberta Q. Herzberg, and Rick K. Wilson, 1992. Advice and Consent: Unitary Actors, Advisory Models, and Experimental Tests. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(4): 603-633.

Imai, K., Keele, L., Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T. 2011. 鈥淯npacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies.'' American Political Science Review, 105(4):765-789.  

Jasso, Guillermina, 2010. Linking Individuals and Societies. Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 34 (1): 1-51. 

Jasso, Guillermina, 2008. A New Unified Theory of Sociobehavioral Forces. European Sociological Review 24:411-434.

Kedar, Orit, 2005. When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review. 99 (2): 185-199.

Krehbiel, K. 1988. 鈥淪patial Models of Legislative Choice.鈥 Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13(3): 259-319.

Leamer, E. 1983. 鈥淟et's Take the 'Con' Out of Econometrics.鈥 American Economic Review 73: 31-43.

Levine, D. K., Palfrey, T. R. 2007. The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study.鈥 American Political Science Review 101(1): 143-58. 

Lin, T-m. 1999. 鈥淭he Historical Significance of Economic Voting, 1872-1996.鈥 Social Science History 23: 561-591. 

Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1972. 鈥淓xpectations and the Neutrality of Money.鈥 Journal of Economic Theory 4, 103鈥124. 

Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1973. 鈥淪ome International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs.鈥 American Economic Review 63, 326-334. 

Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1976. 鈥淓conometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.鈥 Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy 1: 19-46. 

Lucas, R. E. Jr., 1993. 鈥淢aking a Miracle.鈥 Econometrica 61(2): 251-272. 

McCallum, Bennett T., 1983. "On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models: An attempt at perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics 11(2): 139-168.  

McElrath R., Boyd, R. 2007. Mathematical Models of Social Evolution. A Guide for the Perplexed. The University of Chicago Press.  

McKelvey, R. D., and T. R. Palfrey. 1995. 鈥淨uantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.鈥 Games and Economic Behavior 10: 6-38. 

McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1992. 鈥淎n Experimental Study of the Centipede Game.鈥 Econometrica 60: 803-836. 

McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R. 1998. 鈥淨uantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games.鈥 Experimental Economics 1: 9-41. 

McKelvey, R. D., Ordeshook, P. C. 1982. 鈥淎n Experimental Test of Cooperative Solution Theory for Normal Form Games.鈥 In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff. 

Morton, R. B. 1999. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 

Morton, R., Williams, K. C. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  

Palfrey, T. R., Rosenthal, H. 1985. 鈥淰oter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty.鈥 American Political Science Review 79(1): 62-78. 

Poteete, A. R., M . A. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2009. Multiple Methods in Practice: Collective Action and the Commons. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 

Riker, W. H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Riker, W. H. 1967. 鈥淏argaining in a Three-Person Game.鈥 American Political Science Review 61(3): 642-656. 

Riker, W. H. 1983. 鈥淧olitical Theory and the Art of Heresthetics.鈥 In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. A. W. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association. 

Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. 鈥淎 Theory of the Calculus of Voting.鈥 American Political Science Review 62(1): 25鈥42.  

Rohde, David W. 1979. 鈥淩isk鈥慴earing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of the United States House of Representatives.鈥 American Journal of Political Science 23(1): 1鈥26. 

Sargent, T. 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Shively, W. P. 2010. The Craft of Political Research, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 

Signorino, C. S. 1999. 鈥淪trategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict.鈥 American Political Science Review 93: 279-297. 

Signorino, C. S. 2003. 鈥淪tructure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models.鈥 Political Analysis 11(4): 316-344. 

Simon, C. P., Blume, L. 1994. Mathematics for Economists. New York: Norton.  

Wagner, R. H. 2001. 鈥淲ho's Afraid of 'Rational Choice Theory'?鈥 Department of Government, University of Texas. Typescript. 

Whitten-Woodring, J., James, P. 2012. 鈥淔ourth Estate or Mouthpiece? A Formal Model of Media, Protest, and Government Repression.鈥 Political Communication 29(2): 113-136. 

Ziliak, S. T., and D. N. McCloskey. 2008. The Cult of Statistical Significance: How the Standard Error Cost Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.